Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants
49 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2007 Last revised: 1 Mar 2010
Date Written: October 1, 2008
We examine the strategic non-revelation of information by patent applicants. In a model of a bilateral search of information, we show that patent applicants may conceal information, and that examiners make their screening intensity contingent upon the received information. We then analyze the effects of a double review policy and a policy in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. The implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, but its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy involves equal screening intensity across all applications, requires a limited commitment power and induces truthful revelation.
Keywords: Patents, Information, Incentives
JEL Classification: O31, O34, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation