Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants

49 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2007 Last revised: 1 Mar 2010

See all articles by Corinne Langinier

Corinne Langinier

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Philippe Marcoul

University of Alberta - Department of Rural Economy

Date Written: October 1, 2008

Abstract

We examine the strategic non-revelation of information by patent applicants. In a model of a bilateral search of information, we show that patent applicants may conceal information, and that examiners make their screening intensity contingent upon the received information. We then analyze the effects of a double review policy and a policy in which examiners ex ante commit to screening efforts. The implementation of the former policy reduces strategic non-revelation, but its overall implication remains unclear. The latter policy involves equal screening intensity across all applications, requires a limited commitment power and induces truthful revelation.

Keywords: Patents, Information, Incentives

JEL Classification: O31, O34, D83

Suggested Citation

Langinier, Corinne and Marcoul, Philippe, Search of Prior Art and Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants (October 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=991172 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.991172

Corinne Langinier

University of Alberta - Department of Economics ( email )

8-14 Tory Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4
Canada

Philippe Marcoul (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Department of Rural Economy ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta
Canada

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