Potential for Expropriation through Joint Ventures
Posted: 17 May 2007
We examine the potential expropriation of a firm's intellectual capital that results from joint venture agreements when a firm's joint venture partner becomes the target of an acquisition attempt. We find that: (1) non-targeted joint venture partners often suffer losses in value upon the announcement of the acquisition; (2) the magnitude of the loss increases with the R intensity of the non-targeted joint venture partner; and (3) average bidder returns are less negative for acquirers if the affected joint venture partners report R&D spending and are in the same line of business as the acquirer. Our estimate of the average loss is $843 million per firm, roughly 3% of the non-targeted firm's pre-announcement equity value. Our evidence suggests a previously unrecognized merger motive in that joint ventures expose a firm's intellectual capital to the risk of expropriation.
Keywords: Intellectual capital, Joint ventures, Mergers, Agency costs
JEL Classification: G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation