Agency Costs, Governance, and Organizational Forms: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry
47 Pages Posted: 16 Mar 2007
Date Written: February 2007
Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992-2004, this paper examines the impact of fund management companies' organizational forms on the level of agency costs observed within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal, (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families are more likely to be implicated in the recent fund scandals; (3) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (4) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus.
Keywords: Organizational form, Mutual funds, Agency costs, Governance
JEL Classification: G23, G30, G34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation