Do Mergers Result in Collusion?

34 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2007

See all articles by Mattias Ganslandt

Mattias Ganslandt

Centre for European Law and Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics; University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Date Written: January 14, 2004

Abstract

We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions result in coordinated effects. In particular, higher market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and, consequently, the relevance of simple checklists in merger control can be questioned.

Keywords: Merger Control, Collusion, Coordinated Effects, Oligopolistic Dominance, Competition Policy

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L41

Suggested Citation

Ganslandt, Mattias and Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, Do Mergers Result in Collusion? (January 14, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=967814 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.967814

Mattias Ganslandt (Contact Author)

Centre for European Law and Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.celec.eu

Research Institute of Industrial Economics ( email )

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Sweden
+46 8 665 4500 (Phone)
+46 8 665 4599 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.industrialeconomics.se/mg

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics ( email )

Campus Box 256
Boulder, CO 80309
United States
303-4927588 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.mattiasganslandt.com

Pehr-Johan Norbäck

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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