Executive Compensation in NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX Listed Firms

Posted: 2 Mar 2007

See all articles by João Paulo Vieito

João Paulo Vieito

Scholl of Business Studies - Polytechnic Instituto of Viana do Castelo

Antonio Melo Cerqueira

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

Elisio Brandao

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

Walayet A. Khan

University of Evansville

Date Written: February 20, 2007

Abstract

We analyzed executive compensation in NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms during the period between 1992 and 2005.

Our results reveal that NYSE executive received, on average, much more total compensation than NASDAQ and AMEX executives, primarily because NYSE firms are larger companies.

NYSE executives received more salary than NASDAQ and AMEX executives between 1992 and 2004 and this difference is statistically significant. Bonus is also larger in NYSE companies than NASDAQ, and this difference increases after 2001. NASDAQ executives received much more stock options values than NYSE and AMEX executives between 1998 to 2001. However, the difference between NASDAQ and the NYSE is only statistically significant in the years 1999 and 2000, and the number of executives from AMEX that received restricted stocks is very small. After the year 2001, executives from the NYSE received more restricted stocks than NASDAQ executives, and this difference is statistically significant. LTIP continues to be a residual compensation component. When we analysed the factors explaining CEO and Director compensation in NYSE and NASDAQ listed firms, we find that the factor that explains most part of total compensation, option ratio and short term compensation is the size of the firm. Also stock return volatility is a important factor to explain executive compensation. We also found that factors like the age of the executive as CEO, ROA, the number of stock options that the executive have that are vested but not exercised, the growth of the firm sales during the last five years, the last price of calendar year of the firm stock, if the executive yes interlocked or not have a important role in explain CEO and Director compensation.

We also found that the factors that explain CEO and Director compensation are not all the same in when we compare executives from NYSE and NASDAQ, and in the case of some of them are the same, the intensity is different and generally this difference is statistically significant.

Keywords: executive compensation, NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX

JEL Classification: G38

Suggested Citation

Vieito, João Paulo and Cerqueira, Antonio Melo and Brandão, Elísio Fernando Moreira and Khan, Walayet A., Executive Compensation in NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX Listed Firms (February 20, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=966297 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.966297

João Paulo Vieito (Contact Author)

Scholl of Business Studies - Polytechnic Instituto of Viana do Castelo ( email )

Avenida Miguel Dantas
Valença, 4930
Portugal

Antonio Melo Cerqueira

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )

Rua Roberto Frias
s/n
Porto, 4200-464
Portugal

Elísio Fernando Moreira Brandão

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )

Rua Roberto Frias
s/n
Porto, 4200-464
Portugal

Walayet A. Khan

University of Evansville ( email )

School of Business Admin 1800 Lincoln Avenue
Evansville, IN 47722
United States
812-479-2869 (Phone)
812-479-2872 (Fax)

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