An Organizational Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance: Costs, Contingencies, and Complementarities

Abstract

This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses the effectiveness of corporate governance and implications for policy. Most corporate governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices (e.g. shareholder activism, board independence) and performance outcomes, but neglects how interdependences between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations in the effectiveness of different corporate governance practices. In contrast to such 'closed systems' approaches, we propose a framework based on 'open systems' approaches to organizations which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies and complementarities of different corporate governance practices. These three sets of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore how costs, contingencies and complementarities impact approaches to policy such as 'soft-law' or 'hard law', and their effectiveness in different contexts.

Keywords: corporate governance, international comparison, organization theory

JEL Classification: G43, J50, L20, P50