Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-Rule Institution

36 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2007

See all articles by David P. Baron

David P. Baron

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Abstract

This paper presents a complete information model of competitive lobbying in a majority-rule institution where lobbying consists of providing politically-valuable resources to legislators. Legislators have three roles. First, they act as allies or opponents in deciding whether to consider a lobbyist's offer. Second, they act as agenda-setters in deciding whether to bring a policy alternative to a vote. Third, they vote on the agenda. The stationary equilibria include minimal majorities and supermajorities and involve unilateral, counteractive and preemptive lobbying. Supermajorities are recruited either to influence agenda formation or to preempt the opposing lobbyist.

Suggested Citation

Baron, David P., Competitive Lobbying and Supermajorities in a Majority-Rule Institution. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 4, pp. 607-642, December 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=954845 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00461.x

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