Assortative Matching and the Education Gap

Borradores de Economia Working Paper Series

36 Pages Posted: 26 Dec 2006

See all articles by Ximena Peña

Ximena Peña

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

This paper attempts to explain the decrease and reversal of the education gap between males and females. Given a continuum of agents, the education decisions are modelled as an assignment game with endogenous types. In the first stage agents choose their education level and in the second they participate in the labor and marriage markets. Competition among potential matches ensures that the efficient education levels can always be sustained in equilibrium, but there may be inefficient equilibria. Combining asymmetries intrinsic to the modelled markets the model reproduces the observed education gap.

Keywords: Assortative matching, pre-marital investments, efficiency, gender

JEL Classification: C78, D13, D61

Suggested Citation

Pena, Ximena, Assortative Matching and the Education Gap (December 2006). Borradores de Economia Working Paper Series, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=953299 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.953299

Ximena Pena (Contact Author)

Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics ( email )

Carrera 1a No. 18A-10
Santafe de Bogota, AA4976
Colombia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
64
Abstract Views
987
rank
423,208
PlumX Metrics