Online Auctions

71 Pages Posted: 23 Dec 2006 Last revised: 9 Jun 2021

See all articles by Axel Ockenfels

Axel Ockenfels

University of Cologne - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

David Reiley

Pandora Media, Inc.; UC Berkeley School of Information

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg

Date Written: December 2006

Abstract

The economic literature on online auctions is rapidly growing because of the enormous amount of freely available field data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research opportunities. In this article, we survey the theoretical, empirical, and experimental research on bidder strategies (including the timing of bids and winner's-curse effects) and seller strategies (including reserve-price policies and the use of buy-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules and multi-object pricing rules).

Suggested Citation

Ockenfels, Axel and Reiley, David H. and Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, Online Auctions (December 2006). NBER Working Paper No. w12785, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=953208

Axel Ockenfels

University of Cologne - Department of Economics ( email )

Albertus Magnus Platz
Cologne 50923
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

David H. Reiley (Contact Author)

Pandora Media, Inc. ( email )

2101 WEBSTER ST 16TH FLOOR
Oakland, CA 94612
United States

UC Berkeley School of Information ( email )

102 South Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-4600
United States

Abdolkarim Sadrieh

University of Magdeburg ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Management
Postbox 4120
39016 Magdeburg
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.ww.uni-magdeburg.de

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
174
Abstract Views
2,673
rank
210,839
PlumX Metrics