The Effect of Network Ties on Accounting Controls in a Supply Alliance: Field Study Evidence

50 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2006

See all articles by Wai Fong Chua

Wai Fong Chua

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Accounting

Habib Mahama

Qatar University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

Longer-term alliances between corporate buyers and sellers are now commonplace. Extant research predominantly models these interorganizational relationships as dyads. This field study seeks to extend current research in two ways. First, it analyses a supply alliance as nested within a larger network of interorganizational relationships. The paper demonstrates that network ties with 'significant others' influence the operation of accounting controls in the focal supply alliance. That is, ties with third and fourth parties materially impact the management control of an alliance. Second, like other social collectives such as firms and societies, networks are embedded in implicit normative and interpretive frameworks that influence and are influenced by accounting controls. Evidence is provided as to how tacit beliefs about 'fair' pricing and 'appropriate' supplier behaviour impact upon the performance management of the focal supply alliance, thus making it difficult to draw the distinction between accounting as a 'technical' control as opposed to a form of 'social' control.

Keywords: Accounting Controls in Networks, Supply Alliances, Performance Management, Norms, Actor Network Theory

JEL Classification: M41, M30, M10

Suggested Citation

Chua, Wai Fong and Mahama, Habib, The Effect of Network Ties on Accounting Controls in a Supply Alliance: Field Study Evidence (August 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=943576 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.943576

Wai Fong Chua (Contact Author)

UNSW Australia Business School, School of Accounting ( email )

Sydney, NSW 2052
Australia
+61 2 9385 5828 (Phone)
+61 2 9385 5925 (Fax)

Habib Mahama

Qatar University ( email )

College of Business and Economics
Qatar University
Doha, 2713
Qatar
+97444037144 (Phone)
2713 (Fax)

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