Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans: Evidence from Private Enterprises in China

18 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2006

See all articles by Chong-En Bai

Chong-En Bai

The University of Hong Kong - School of Economics and Finance; University of Michigan - William Davidson Institute

Jiangyong LU

Center for China in the World Economy

Zhigang Tao

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business

Abstract

Poor protection of private property has limited the access to bank loans by private enterprises in developing and transition economies. Under those circumstances, private entrepreneurs have resorted to various ways of enhancing the de facto protection of private property. Using a dataset of 3,073 private enterprises in China, this paper empirically investigates the impact of political participation and philanthropic activities informal substitutes for the lack of formal protection of private property on the access to bank loans.

Suggested Citation

Bai, Chong-En and LU, Jiangyong and Tao, Zhigang, Property Rights Protection and Access to Bank Loans: Evidence from Private Enterprises in China. Economics of Transition, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 611-628, October 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=933390 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2006.00269.x

Chong-En Bai (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

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University of Michigan - William Davidson Institute ( email )

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Jiangyong LU

Center for China in the World Economy ( email )

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Zhigang Tao

The University of Hong Kong - School of Business ( email )

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China
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