Delegating Disenfranchisement Decisions

49 Pages Posted: 5 Jul 2006

See all articles by Anna Bassi

Anna Bassi

UNC Chapel Hill

Rebecca Morton

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics

Jessica Trounstine

Princeton University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: April 29, 2006

Abstract

Most empirical analyses of felon disenfranchisement and other voting rights laws focus on the implications of the laws on potential voters and political outcomes as if they are fully implemented. However, the administrative structure used by states to implement these laws varies as well as the extent that the implementation is monitored and the competitiveness of the electoral environment. We formally model the process by which states choose voting rights measures such as felon disenfranchisement laws. We find that different administrative and monitoring structures as well as competitiveness of the electoral environment are likely to affect both the adoption and implementation of the laws. Even states with identical laws but different administrative and/or monitoring systems and different levels of electoral competition are predicted to have different degrees of implementation. We argue that empirical research that ignores these interactive e¤ects may inaccurately estimate the effects of the laws on potential voters and political outcomes.

Keywords: disenfranchisment laws, delegation

Suggested Citation

Bassi, Anna and Morton, Rebecca and Trounstine, Jessica, Delegating Disenfranchisement Decisions (April 29, 2006). 1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=913300 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.913300

Anna Bassi

UNC Chapel Hill ( email )

361 Hamilton Hall
CB#3265
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3265
United States
(919) 962-0404 (Phone)
(919) 962-0432 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.unc.edu/~abassi

Rebecca Morton (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics ( email )

715 Broadway
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-998-3706 (Phone)

Jessica Trounstine

Princeton University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
92
Abstract Views
1,182
rank
336,390
PlumX Metrics