Concertina Reforms with International Capital Mobility

U. of Nottingham Research Paper No. 2006/17

18 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2006

See all articles by Udo Kreickemeier

Udo Kreickemeier

University of Tuebingen; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Goettingen (Göttingen) - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration

Pascalis Raimondos

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance; Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2006

Abstract

We show that the standard concertina result for tariff reforms - i.e. lowering the highest tariff increases welfare - no longer holds in general if we allow for international capital mobility. The result can break down if the good whose tariff is lowered is not capital intensive. If the concertina reform lowers welfare it lowers market access as well, thereby compromising a second goal that is typically connected with trade liberalisation.

Keywords: Trade Policy Reform, International Factor Mobility, Welfare, Market Access

JEL Classification: F11, F13, F15

Suggested Citation

Kreickemeier, Udo and Raimondos, Pascalis, Concertina Reforms with International Capital Mobility (2006). U. of Nottingham Research Paper No. 2006/17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=912490 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.912490

Udo Kreickemeier (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen ( email )

DE-72074 Tubingen
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Goettingen (Göttingen) - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
Goettingen, 37073
Germany

Pascalis Raimondos

Queensland University of Technology - School of Economics and Finance ( email )

GPO Box 2434
2 George Street
Brisbane, Queensland 4001
Australia

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Solbjergs Plads 3
DK-2000 Frederiksberg C
Denmark
+45 38 152 594 (Phone)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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