Nexus, Throwbacks, and the Weighting Game

21 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Kelly D. Edmiston

Kelly D. Edmiston

Center for Insurance Policy & Research / NAIC; University of Kansas - School of Medicine; University of Missouri; Baker University

Date Written: December 2004

Abstract

This paper modifies a model proposed by Anand and Sansing (2000) to explain why states have chosen different formulas for corporate income apportionment. I demonstrate that nexus assumptions and allocation rules can have significant effects on the outcomes of the model, and are important considerations in analyzing the impetus for and effects of apportionment competition.

Keywords: apportionment, state corporate income tax, nexus

JEL Classification: H25, H73

Suggested Citation

Edmiston, Kelly D., Nexus, Throwbacks, and the Weighting Game (December 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=899624 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.899624

Kelly D. Edmiston (Contact Author)

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University of Missouri ( email )

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