Mergers Increase Default Risk

33 Pages Posted: 17 Mar 2006 Last revised: 14 Mar 2012

Date Written: January 26, 2009

Abstract

We examine the impact of mergers on default risk. Despite the potential for asset diversification, we find that, on average, a merger increases the default risk of the acquiring firm. This result cannot solely be explained by the tendency for generally safe acquirers to purchase riskier targets or by the tendency of acquiring firms to increase leverage post-merger. Our evidence suggests that manager-related issues may play an important role. In particular, we find larger merger-related increases in risk at firms where CEOs have large option-based compensation, where recent stock performance is poor, and where idiosyncratic equity volatility is high. These results suggest that the increased default risk may arise from aggressive managerial actions affecting risk enough to outweigh the strong risk-reducing asset diversification expected from a typical merger.

Keywords: mergers, default risk, EDF

JEL Classification: G34, G33

Suggested Citation

Furfine, Craig and Rosen, Richard J., Mergers Increase Default Risk (January 26, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=891422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.891422

Craig Furfine (Contact Author)

Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )

Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Richard J. Rosen

Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago - Economic Research ( email )

230 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
United States
312-322-6368 (Phone)
312-294-6262 (Fax)

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