Deposit Insurance and Depositor Discipline: Direct Evidence on Bank Switching Behavior in Japan

Hi-Stat Discussion Paper No. 125

24 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2006

See all articles by Noriko Inakura

Noriko Inakura

University of Tsukuba - Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering

Satoshi Shimizutani

Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research

Ralph Paprzycki

Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research

Date Written: October 2005

Abstract

As Japan's financial system moves toward a more market oriented one, depositor discipline is expected to play a larger role in the monitoring of the country's banks. Relying on detailed survey data on households' bank switching behavior matched with banks' financial data, we examine households' response to bank risk and different deposit insurance schemes. We find that bank switching in response to risk was more frequent in 2001 than in 1996 and that households' choice of bank provides an adequate reflection of banks' financial health. We also examine the determinants of households' knowledge of the deposit insurance scheme and find that income, the amount of households' financial assets, and educational attainment are all significant factors. What is more, households' extent of knowledge regarding the deposit insurance scheme was an important determinant of bank switching behavior. The results suggest that depositor discipline appears to work and could play an important supplementary role in monitoring the banking sector.

Keywords: depositor discipline, deposit insurance, pay-off, depositor-level data

JEL Classification: G21, G32

Suggested Citation

Inakura, Noriko and Shimizutani, Satoshi and Paprzycki, Ralph, Deposit Insurance and Depositor Discipline: Direct Evidence on Bank Switching Behavior in Japan (October 2005). Hi-Stat Discussion Paper No. 125, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=886006 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.886006

Noriko Inakura

University of Tsukuba - Graduate School of Systems and Information Engineering ( email )

Ibaraki, 305-8573
Japan

Satoshi Shimizutani

Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

2-1 Naka Kunitachi-shi
Tokyo 186-8306
Japan

Ralph Paprzycki (Contact Author)

Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research ( email )

2-1 Naka Kunitachi-shi
Tokyo 186-8306
Japan

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