Employee Financial Participation and Productivity: An Empirical Reappraisal

20 Pages Posted: 8 May 2006

See all articles by Andrew M. Robinson

Andrew M. Robinson

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business; University of Leeds - Division of Accounting and Finance

Nick Wilson

University of Leeds - Credit Management Research Centre; Leeds University Business School

Abstract

Avner Ben-Ner and Derek Jones cast doubt on the notion of a simple causal link between financial participation (FP) and productivity, and consequently on the validity of much of the empirical literature that has sought to quantify this relationship. This paper is an attempt to investigate this proposition. Our empirical reappraisal revealed that the route through which employee share ownership and profit-sharing schemes achieve these gains is quite separate and more involved than either the theory or prior empirical research suggests. This is particularly evident by extending the complementarities thesis beyond purely participatory bundles to embrace firm-specific and organizational variables. Our analysis also addressed recent calls to aid the interpretation of the observed effects of FP by creating a link between the use and operation of FP and its impact on productivity.

Suggested Citation

Robinson, Andrew M. and Wilson, Nicholas, Employee Financial Participation and Productivity: An Empirical Reappraisal. British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 31-50, March 2006, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=885402 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2006.00486.x

Andrew M. Robinson (Contact Author)

University of Leeds - Faculty of Business ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom
0113-343-4907 (Phone)

University of Leeds - Division of Accounting and Finance ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

Nicholas Wilson

University of Leeds - Credit Management Research Centre ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom
+44 (0)113 343 4472 (Phone)

Leeds University Business School ( email )

Leeds LS2 9JT
United Kingdom
+44 (0)113 343 4472 (Phone)

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