Mergers, Diversification and Financial Intermediation

36 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2006 Last revised: 19 May 2008

See all articles by Flavio Toxvaerd

Flavio Toxvaerd

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 17, 2008

Abstract

This work presents an equilibrium model of diversification through merger formation. Due to moral hazard problems, poorly capitalized firms are credit rationed and may seek to alleviate the incentive problem (and thereby raise external funds) by either merging, employing a monitor or a combination of the two. Within this setting, the effects on merger activity of different kinds of capital tightening are studied. In particular, credit crunches, collateral squeezes and savings squeezes are analyzed. The main results are that diversifying merger activity increases during times of economic expansion and is positively related to aggregate economic activity, business incorporations and easing of access to credit (both interest and non-interest terms of credit). Furthermore, the model offers a rationale for diversification that is immune to the diversification neutrality result and furthermore, explains why diversified companies trade at a discount relative to their non-diversified counterparts.

Keywords: Mergers, merger waves, diversification, diversification discount, financial intermediation, capital tightening

JEL Classification: L16, G34

Suggested Citation

Toxvaerd, Flavio, Mergers, Diversification and Financial Intermediation (May 17, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=879828 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.879828

Flavio Toxvaerd (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )

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