Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States

40 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2006

See all articles by Kishore Gawande

Kishore Gawande

University of Texas at Austin

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

The authors study whether political campaign contributions influence agricultural protection in the United States in the manner suggested by the political economy model of Grossman and Helpman (1994). This is the first attempt to test this model using agricultural data. The authors test the model using a detailed cross-sectional data set of agricultural protection, subsidies, and political action committee (PAC) contributions in the late 1990s. The model is qualitatively affirmed by the data. They make a novel attempt to solve a puzzle about the model's quantitative implications, also found in recent studies. This solution makes the simple model consistent with the complicated decisionmaking process in real world government. The results imply the underpinnings of a political economy equilibrium that will be hard to dislodge.

Suggested Citation

Gawande, Kishore and Hoekman, Bernard, Lobbying and Agricultural Trade Policy in the United States (January 2006). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3819, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=875885

Kishore Gawande (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin ( email )

2317 Speedway
Austin, TX 78712
United States

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
102
Abstract Views
857
rank
272,622
PlumX Metrics