Competition in Large Markets

37 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2006

See all articles by Jeffrey R. Campbell

Jeffrey R. Campbell

University of Notre Dame; Tilburg University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2005

Abstract

This paper develops a simple and robust implication of free entry followed by competition without substantial strategic interactions: Increasing the number of consumers leaves the distributions of producers' prices and other choices unchanged. In many models featuring non-trivial strategic considerations, producers' prices fall as their numbers increase. Hence, examining the relationship between market size and producers' actions provides a nonparametric tool for empirically discriminating between these distinct approaches to competition. To illustrate its application, I examine observations of restaurants' seating capacities, exit decisions, and prices from 224 U.S. cities. Given factor prices and demographic variables, increasing a city's size increases restaurants' capacities, decreases their exit rate, and decreases their prices. These results suggest that strategic considerations lie at the heart of restaurant pricing and turnover.

Suggested Citation

Campbell, Jeffrey R., Competition in Large Markets (December 2005). NBER Working Paper No. w11847, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=870607

Jeffrey R. Campbell (Contact Author)

University of Notre Dame ( email )

United States

Tilburg University ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
775
PlumX Metrics