Does the European Company Prevent the 'Delaware Effect'?

17 Pages Posted: 8 Dec 2005

See all articles by Joseph A. McCahery

Joseph A. McCahery

Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Erik P. M. Vermeulen

Tilburg University - Department of Business Law; Signify (formerly known as Philips Lighting) - Legal Department; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

This article analyses the history of EU company law and locates a stable 'non-competitive equilibrium'. This equilibrium follows from Member States that founded the EU unwilling to give up their lawmaking authority regarding company law issues. From the outset, Member States were determined to prevent the 'Delaware effect'. Since then, stability has ruled. The agenda-setting in EU company law has changed little during the existence of the EU. Operative incentives, market structure and regulatory results have been more constant than dynamic, even as the recent enactment of the European Company has triggered discussion about competitive lawmaking in Europe.

Suggested Citation

McCahery, Joseph A. and Vermeulen, Erik P.M., Does the European Company Prevent the 'Delaware Effect'?. European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. 785-801, November 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=856749 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2005.00288.x

Joseph A. McCahery (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - School of Law; European Banking Center (EBC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31-(0)13-466-2306 (Phone)
+31-(0)13-466-2323 (Fax)

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Erik P.M. Vermeulen

Tilburg University - Department of Business Law ( email )

Signify (formerly known as Philips Lighting) - Legal Department ( email )

Amstelplein 2
Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Kyushu University - Graduate School of Law ( email )

6-19-1, Hakozaki, Higashiku
Fukuoka, 812-8581
Japan

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
26
Abstract Views
1,468
PlumX Metrics