Corporate Governance in China - is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?

17 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2005

See all articles by Udo C. Braendle

Udo C. Braendle

American University in Dubai

Tanja Gasser

University of Vienna

Juergen Noll

University of Vienna - Department for Business Studies

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Despite the opening of the market and partial privatization of state-owned companies in China, the state still represents the controlling shareholder in larger companies. By analyzing the weaknesses of Chinese corporate governance we illustrate the framework for harmful corruption. China is characterized by a weak legal system and strong influences of traditions such as guanxi. In this article we analyze the influence of guanxi on the Chinese corporate governance system. We find that guanxi is in general a double-edged sword, but business-to-government guanxi in particular can harm the weak Chinese corporate governance system and hamper its further economic development and growth.

Suggested Citation

Braendle, Udo C. and Gasser, Tanja and Noll, Juergen, Corporate Governance in China - is Economic Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?. Business and Society Review, Vol. 110, No. 4, pp. 389-405, December 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=856591 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0045-3609.2005.00022.x

Udo C. Braendle (Contact Author)

American University in Dubai ( email )

Dubai, UAE 28282
United Arab Emirates

Tanja Gasser

University of Vienna ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna 1210, Vienna
Austria

Juergen Noll

University of Vienna - Department for Business Studies ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, A1210
Austria
+43 1 42 77 38 105 (Phone)
+43 1 42 77 38 104 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
1,763
PlumX Metrics