Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures

37 Pages Posted: 3 Nov 2005

See all articles by Patrick Greenlee

Patrick Greenlee

U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Research sharing is an important objective of many research joint ventures. When partners share R&D but do not maximize joint profits, large consortia are more profitable than small ones, and joint ventures prefer dispersed rivals. For much of the spillover space, a coalition formation game that permits limited membership predicts that at most, three joint ventures form. Research-sharing joint ventures improve welfare when spillovers are low, and banning research sharing joint ventures is beneficial for high spillovers. With imperfect research sharing and low spillovers, allowing only research sharing is the best industry-wide joint venture alternative for consumer surplus.

Suggested Citation

Greenlee, Patrick, Endogenous Formation of Competitive Research Sharing Joint Ventures. Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 355-391, September 2005, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=811016

Patrick Greenlee (Contact Author)

U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division ( email )

600 E Street NW
Suite 10,000
Washington, DC 20530
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
670
PlumX Metrics