The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-96

14 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2005

See all articles by Jana Vyrastekova

Jana Vyrastekova

Radboud University Nijmegen - Department of Economics

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 11, 2005

Abstract

We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a behind the veil of ignorance design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in trust, and that women are slightly more trustworthy. However, men's strategies are bimodal, peaking at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and the Pareto efficient frontier, while women's strategies are single peaked at moderate tranfers. Moreover, if a man [woman] exhibits low trust, he [she] is likely to be a money-maximizer [a risk or betrayal averse reciprocator].

Keywords: Gender differences, trust game, experiment, strategy method behind the veil of ignorance

JEL Classification: C72, C91

Suggested Citation

Vyrastekova, Jana and Onderstal, Sander, The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Note on Gender Differences (August 11, 2005). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2005-96, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=807724 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.807724

Jana Vyrastekova (Contact Author)

Radboud University Nijmegen - Department of Economics ( email )

Nijmegen, 6500 HK
Netherlands

Sander Onderstal

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

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