Welfare and Market Access Effects of Piecemeal Tariff Reform

28 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 1998

See all articles by Jiandong Ju

Jiandong Ju

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics; Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

Kala Krishna

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Abstract

In a situation where tariff reforms are being negotiated between two parties, one of which aims to raise its exports and the other aims to raise its welfare, tariff cuts must be in the interest of at least one party. It is possible for the interests of the two sides to conflict. Conflict is certain if the excess demand for export goods does not respond to changes in the prices of imported goods. In this case, any policy which raises imports, must also reduce welfare.

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Ju, Jiandong and Krishna, Kala, Welfare and Market Access Effects of Piecemeal Tariff Reform. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=80128 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.80128

Jiandong Ju

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )

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Tsinghua University - PBC School of Finance

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Kala Krishna (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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