Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror

40 Pages Posted: 31 Jan 2005

See all articles by Raphael Franck

Raphael Franck

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Miriam Krausz

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is however ineffective, and preemptive defense is required, when a population of intended victims confronts supreme-value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since preemption may impose collective punishment, while, in the absence of preemption, the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public-safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.

Keywords: Defense economics, defensive preemption, counter-terrorism, terror, international judges, profiling

JEL Classification: D81, H56

Suggested Citation

Franck, Raphael and Hillman, Arye L. and Krausz, Miriam, Public Safety and the Moral Dilemma in the Defense Against Terror (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=653841

Raphael Franck (Contact Author)

Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Department of Economics ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, 91905
Israel

Arye L. Hillman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+97 29 774 6424 (Phone)
+97 29 771 5628 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Miriam Krausz

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+97 23 531 7220 (Phone)
+97 23 531 3180 (Fax)

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