Management Control and Innovative Activity

Posted: 3 Jan 2005

See all articles by Dirk Czarnitzki

Dirk Czarnitzki

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Kornelius Kraft

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

This paper discusses theoretically the different incentives of managers versus firm owners to invest in innovative activities. There are opposing effects concerning R&D intensity in the manager-controlled firm. Our study on the determinants of R&D intensity presents empirical results concerning this question. A sample of German firms with 4,126 observations is used to estimate Tobit and semi-parametric censored least absolute deviation (CLAD) models. It turns out that the owner-led firms invest less into R&D than the managerial firms. With respect to the manager-led firms, we have mixed results concerning the question whether expenditures on R&D depend on the control exerted.

Keywords: Censored Regression Models, Incentives, Innovative Activity, Managerial versus Owner-led Firms

JEL Classification: C14, C24, D21, O31, O32

Suggested Citation

Czarnitzki, Dirk and Kraft, Kornelius, Management Control and Innovative Activity. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=639133

Dirk Czarnitzki (Contact Author)

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326906 (Phone)
+32 16 325799 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/msi/faculty_members.htm

Kornelius Kraft

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755-3152 (Phone)
+49 231 755-3155 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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