The Changing International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions

37 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2004 Last revised: 16 Sep 2009

See all articles by Margaret C. Levenstein

Margaret C. Levenstein

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center; The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Business Economics and Public Policy

Valerie Y. Suslow

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Date Written: November 10, 2004

Abstract

In an attempt to create more consistently pro-competitive antitrust policies, many countries have eliminated or restricted antitrust exemptions for firms engaged in export activity. Of the fifty-six countries surveyed, we find only seventeen which offer exporters an exemption from domestic antitrust laws. Thirty-three countries provide no exemption from antitrust laws for export activity, but exempt such activity implicitly: their competition laws are silent on restrictive activities that affect foreign markets. Within the last decade, at least ten countries have rewritten their laws, moving from explicit exemptions to this more passive policy of speaking only to the domestic market. However, the construction of national antitrust laws that ban only activity that harms domestic competition leaves a vacuum in which export cartels can operate with no obvious institution to restrict their activities or limit adverse effects on competition. The elimination of reporting requirements has reduced the information that we have about their activities. International cooperation to regulate and prosecute collusive activity affecting international markets could rationalize these policies and promote competition more effectively than the current haphazard set of national laws.

Keywords: Competition policy, antitrust, collusion, market access, exporting trading company act, Webb-Pomerene act

JEL Classification: L41, L13, K21, K33, F13

Suggested Citation

Levenstein, Margaret C. and Suslow, Valerie Y., The Changing International Status of Export Cartel Exemptions (November 10, 2004). American University International Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 3, Ross School of Business Paper No. 897, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=618201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.618201

Margaret C. Levenstein (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-615-9088 (Phone)
734-647-1186 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~maggiel

The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Business Economics and Public Policy

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-764-8336 (Phone)

Valerie Y. Suslow

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

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