Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity

21 Pages Posted: 28 Oct 2004 Last revised: 25 Oct 2014

See all articles by Dirk Czarnitzki

Dirk Czarnitzki

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW); Catholic University of Leuven (KUL)

Kornelius Kraft

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

The present paper first discusses theoretically the different incentives of manager- versus owner-controlled firms for investment into innovative activity. In addition, the role of debt financing is analyzed. Subsequently the results from an empirical study on the determinants of innovative activity measured by patent applications are presented. A sample of German firms covering 2,793 observations is used, and it turns out that companies with widely held capital stock are more active in innovation, i.e. weakly controlled managers show a higher innovation propensity. However, the higher the leverage the more disciplined the managers are.

Keywords: Innovation, patents, corporate governance, limited dependent variables

JEL Classification: C25, L11, O31, O32

Suggested Citation

Czarnitzki, Dirk and Kraft, Kornelius, Capital Control, Debt Financing and Innovative Activity (October 2004). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 04-074, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=610243 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.610243

Dirk Czarnitzki (Contact Author)

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) ( email )

Faculty of Economics and Business
Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326906 (Phone)
+32 16 325799 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/msi/faculty_members.htm

Kornelius Kraft

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755-3152 (Phone)
+49 231 755-3155 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
220
Abstract Views
1,370
rank
169,040
PlumX Metrics