Auctions of Shares with a Secondary Market and Tender Offers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1077

Posted: 10 Aug 1999

See all articles by Antonio S. Mello

Antonio S. Mello

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Finance, Investment and Banking

John E. Parsons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

Date Written: December 1994

Abstract

The method of sale of a corporation's shares has important effects on its value and future performance. The market for shares is composed of both small investors purchasing shares for portfolio reasons and large investors with an interest in obtaining control. This inherent asymmetry is critical in the design of an optimal method of sale. Should the sale disperse the shares and let interested shareholders assemble a controlling bloc in the secondary market, or alternatively should the sale reserve and transfer directly control of the shares? This paper analyses alternative methods of the sale of shares, taking into account the opportunities created by the existence of a secondary market including a tender offer market for the shares. With private as well as public benefits from ownership, we show how competition among different investors determines the optimal method of sale. The paper provides guidelines for the design of sales in privatizations and in (Initial Public Offers) and makes clear the importance of setting the right ownership structure for the firm.

JEL Classification: C72, G32

Suggested Citation

Mello, Antonio S. and Parsons, John E., Auctions of Shares with a Secondary Market and Tender Offers (December 1994). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1077, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5967

Antonio S. Mello (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Finance, Investment and Banking ( email )

975 University Avenue
Madison, WI 53706
United States
608-263-3423 (Phone)
608-265-4195 (Fax)

John E. Parsons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )

100 Main Street
E62-416
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.mit.edu/~jparsons/

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