Employment, Deterrence, and Crime in a Dynamic Model

28 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2004

See all articles by Susumu Imai

Susumu Imai

Queen's University - Department of Economics

Kala Krishna

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

Using maximum likelihood techniques and monthly panel data we solve and estimate an explicitly dynamic model of criminal behavior where current criminal activity impacts future labor market outcomes. We show that the threat of future adverse effects in the labor market when arrested acts as a strong deterrent to crime. Moreover, such forward-looking behavior is estimated to be important. Hence, policies that weaken this deterrence will be much less effective in fighting crime. This suggests that prevention is more powerful than redemption since anticipated redemption allows criminals to look forward to negating the consequences of their crimes.

Suggested Citation

Imai, Susumu and Krishna, Kala, Employment, Deterrence, and Crime in a Dynamic Model. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=573002

Susumu Imai (Contact Author)

Queen's University - Department of Economics ( email )

99 University Avenue
Kingston K7L 3N6, Ontario
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/imai/

Kala Krishna

Pennsylvania State University - Department of Economics ( email )

523 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802-3306
United States
814-865-1106 (Phone)
814-863-4775 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
27
Abstract Views
837
PlumX Metrics