Financial Disclosure and Bond Insurance

Posted: 4 Aug 2004

See all articles by Angela K. Gore

Angela K. Gore

George Washington University - School of Business

Kevin D. Sachs

Hofstra University - Department of Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in Business, Frank G. Zarb School of Business

Charles Trzcinka

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

Regulators typically assume that public financial disclosure is necessary for the efficient functioning of capital markets. Economists recognize that other mechanisms, such as insurance, can mitigate problems occurring when buyers have less information than sellers. We examine whether public financial disclosures and bond insurance are substitutes. Our data are from municipal issuers in Michigan, where financial disclosure is required by the state, and Pennsylvania, where disclosure is unregulated. We study municipal issuers because they are not covered by federal securities laws and state laws often allow issuers to choose the level of financial disclosure. Overall, we find that when disclosure is unregulated, issuers substitute between disclosure and insurance. When disclosure is required by state law, issuers use less insurance. Our results imply that required accounting disclosure is not necessarily optimal since rational issuers will trade off public disclosure and insurance when free to do so.

Keywords: Disclosure, regulation, insurance, bond market, local government

JEL Classification: M41, H79, G38, K22

Suggested Citation

Gore, Angela K. and Sachs, Kevin D. and Trzcinka, Charles, Financial Disclosure and Bond Insurance. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=572185

Angela K. Gore (Contact Author)

George Washington University - School of Business ( email )

2201 G St NW
Washington, DC 20052
United States
(202) 994-6195 (Phone)

Kevin D. Sachs

Hofstra University - Department of Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in Business, Frank G. Zarb School of Business ( email )

134 Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11549
United States

Charles Trzcinka

Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance ( email )

Kelley School of Business
1309 E. 10th St.
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-9908 (Phone)
812-855-5875 (Fax)

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