Competition and Well-Being

IZA Discussion Paper No. 1769

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-041/1

54 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2005

See all articles by Jordi Brandts

Jordi Brandts

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona

Arno Riedl

Maastricht University; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Netspar

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Tinbergen Institute

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Date Written: September 2005

Abstract

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that competition has a strong negative impact on social well-being, the disposition towards others, and individually experienced well-being, the emotional state, of those on the long side of the market. We conjecture that this limits the possibilities of satisfactory interaction in the future and, hence, has negative implications for efficiency in the longer-run.

Keywords: Competition, happiness, well-being, laboratory experiment, emotions, market interaction

JEL Classification: A13, C92, D30, J50, M50

Suggested Citation

Brandts, Jordi and Riedl, Arno M. and Van Winden, F. A. A. M., Competition and Well-Being (September 2005). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1769, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-041/1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=548222

Jordi Brandts (Contact Author)

Instituto de Analisis Economico (CSIC) Barcelona ( email )

UAB Campus
E-08193 Bellaterra
Spain

Arno M. Riedl

Maastricht University ( email )

Department of Microeconomics & Public Economics
P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.arnoriedl.com

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Germany

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

F. A. A. M. Van Winden

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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