Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions

41 Pages Posted: 5 May 2004

See all articles by Gadi Fibich

Gadi Fibich

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

Arieh Gavious

Ono Academic College; Ben-Gurion University

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 2004

Abstract

We study private-value auctions with a large number of bidders. We calculate approximations of the equilibrium bids and the seller's revenue in first-price auctions regardless of whether the bidders are symmetric or asymmetric, or risk-neutral or risk-averse. Furthermore, we show that first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, or risk-averse bidders, are asymptotically revenue equivalent to wide classes of standard auctions.

Keywords: Asymptotic methods, asymmetric auctions, revenue equivalence, collusion, large auctions, risk-averse bidders

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

Fibich, Gadi and Gavious, Arieh and Sela, Aner, Asymptotic Analysis of Large Auctions (March 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=540223

Gadi Fibich

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences ( email )

Tel Aviv 69978
Israel

Arieh Gavious

Ono Academic College ( email )

Kyriat Ono
Israel

Ben-Gurion University ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel

Aner Sela (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
14
Abstract Views
792
PlumX Metrics