How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks

25 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2004

See all articles by John M. de Figueiredo

John M. de Figueiredo

Duke University School of Law; Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

Brian S. Silverman

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 16, 2004

Abstract

This paper examines academic earmarks and its role in the funding of university research. It provides a summary and review of the evidence on the supply of earmarks by legislators. It then discusses the role of university lobbying for earmarks on the demand side. After a review of the literature of the impact of earmarks on research quantity and quality, the paper poses a number of public policy questions related to the funding of science.

Keywords: Lobbying, Education, Political Economy

JEL Classification: H52, I22

Suggested Citation

de Figueiredo, John M. and Silverman, Brian S., How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks (March 16, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=521130 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.521130

John M. De Figueiredo (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
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Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Duke Innovation & Entrepreneurship Initiative

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Durham, NC 27701
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Brian S. Silverman

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

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