New York and the Politics of Central Banks, 1781 to the Federal Reserve Act

FRB of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2003-42

44 Pages Posted: 10 Feb 2004

See all articles by Jon R. Moen

Jon R. Moen

University of Mississippi - Department of Economics

Ellis W. Tallman

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

The paper provides a brief history of central banking institutions in the United States. Specifically, the authors highlight the role of New York banking interests in the legislations affecting the creation or expiration of central banking institutions. In our previous research we have detected that New York City banking entities usually exert substantial influence on legislation, greater than their large proportion of United States' banking resources. The authors describe how this influence affected the success or failure of central banking movements in the United States, and the authors use this evidence to support their arguments regarding the influence of New York City bankers on the legislative efforts that culminated in the creation of the Federal Reserve System. The paper argues that successful central banking movements in the United States owed much to the influence of New York City banking interests.

Keywords: Financial crisis, central bank, banking legislation

JEL Classification: N21, N41

Suggested Citation

Moen, Jon R. and Tallman, Ellis W., New York and the Politics of Central Banks, 1781 to the Federal Reserve Act (December 2003). FRB of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2003-42, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=498742 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.498742

Jon R. Moen

University of Mississippi - Department of Economics ( email )

371 Holman Hall
University, MS 38677
United States

Ellis W. Tallman (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ( email )

East 6th & Superior
Cleveland, OH 44101-1387
United States

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