Auctions with Weakly Assymmetric Interdependent Values

28 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2003

See all articles by Gadi Fibich

Gadi Fibich

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

Arieh Gavious

Ono Academic College; Ben-Gurion University

Aner Sela

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: August 2003

Abstract

We study second price auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values where bidders' signals for the value are independently and identically distributed. We also prove an asymptotic revenue equivalence among all standard auctions with weakly asymmetric interdependent values.

Keywords: Weakly assymetric auctions, interdependent values, perturbation analysis

Suggested Citation

Fibich, Gadi and Gavious, Arieh and Sela, Aner, Auctions with Weakly Assymmetric Interdependent Values (August 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=448780

Gadi Fibich

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences ( email )

Tel Aviv 69978
Israel

Arieh Gavious

Ono Academic College ( email )

Kyriat Ono
Israel

Ben-Gurion University ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel

Aner Sela (Contact Author)

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev - Department of Economics ( email )

Beer-Sheva 84105
Israel
+972 8 647 2309 (Phone)
+972 8 647 2941 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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