The Principal-Agent Matching Market

40 Pages Posted: 7 Jun 2003

See all articles by Kaniska Dam

Kaniska Dam

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

David Pérez-Castrillo

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit.

Keywords: Principal-agent, Moral Hazard, Matching, Implementation

JEL Classification: C78, D82, D78

Suggested Citation

Dam, Kaniska and Pérez-Castrillo, David, The Principal-Agent Matching Market (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=413865

Kaniska Dam

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Belgium

David Pérez-Castrillo (Contact Author)

Universidad Autonoma de Barcelona ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain
(34 93) 381 1405 (Phone)
(34 93) 581 2012 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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