Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental Protection

Daniel H. Cole, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Cambridge University Press, 2002

Posted: 23 Apr 2003

See all articles by Daniel H. Cole

Daniel H. Cole

Indiana University Maurer School of Law; Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs

Abstract

Environmental protection and resource conservation depend on the imposition of property rights (broadly defined) because in the absence of some property system - private, common, or public - resource degradation and depletion are inevitable. But there is no universal, first-best property regime for environmental protection in this second-best world.

Using case studies and examples taken from countries around the world, Professor Cole demonstrates that the choice of ownership institution is contingent upon institutional, technological, and ecological circumstances that determine the differential costs of instituting, implementing, and maintaining alternative regimes. Consequently, environmental protection is likely to be more effective and more efficient in a society that relies on multiple (and often mixed) property regimes.

The book concludes with an assessment of the important contemporary issue of 'takings', which arise when different property regimes collide.

JEL Classification: K11, K32, N5, 013, P14, Q2, Q3

Suggested Citation

Cole, Daniel H., Pollution and Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for Environmental Protection. Daniel H. Cole, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, Cambridge University Press, 2002, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=389480

Daniel H. Cole (Contact Author)

Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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