Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk-Dove Games

40 Pages Posted: 8 Jul 2021

See all articles by Srinivas Arigapudi

Srinivas Arigapudi

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Department of Economics, Students

Yuval Heller

Bar Ilan University

Amnon Schreiber

Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 30, 2021

Abstract

The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: asymmetric pure equilibria in which players in one population play ‘hawk’ and players in the other population play ‘dove’, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium. The existing literature on dynamic evolutionary models show that populations will converge into playing one of the asymmetric pure equilibria from any initial state. By contrast, we show that under plausible sampling dynamics, in which agents occasionally revise their actions by
observing either opponents’ behavior or payoffs in a few past interactions, can induce the opposite result: global convergence to the symmetric mixed equilibrium.

Keywords: Chicken game, learning, evolutionary stability, bounded rational- ity, payoff sampling dynamics, action sampling dynamics.

JEL Classification: C72, C73.

Suggested Citation

Arigapudi, Srinivas and Heller, Yuval and Schreiber, Amnon, Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk-Dove Games (June 30, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3868911 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3868911

Srinivas Arigapudi

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

Madison, WI
United States

Yuval Heller (Contact Author)

Bar Ilan University ( email )

Dept. of Economics, Building 504
Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan, 5290002
Israel
+972 5252 82182 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/yuval26/

Amnon Schreiber

Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )

Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905
Israel

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel

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