Bidding at Sequential First-Price Auctions With(Out) Supply Uncertainty: A Laboratory Analysis
UFAE and IAE Working Paper No. 558.03
34 Pages Posted: 18 Jun 2003
Date Written: February 7, 2003
We report on a series of experiments that test the effects of an uncertain supply on the formation of bids and prices in sequential first-price auctions with private-independent values and unit-demands. Supply is assumed uncertain when buyers do not know the exact number of units to be sold (i.e., the length of the sequence). Although we observe a non-monotone behavior when supply is certain and an important overbidding, the data qualitatively support our price trend predictions and the risk neutral Nash equilibrium model of bidding for the last stage of a sequence, whether supply is certain or not. Our study shows that behavior in these markets changes significantly with the presence of an uncertain supply, and that it can be explained by assuming that bidders formulate pessimistic beliefs about the occurrence of another stage.
Keywords: sequential first-price auctions, independent private values, unit-demand, supply uncertainty, bidding behavior, price trends, experimental economics
JEL Classification: D44, C9
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation