WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members’ Revealed Preferences

30 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2021

See all articles by Matteo Fiorini

Matteo Fiorini

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Petros C. Mavroidis

Columbia University - Law School; European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW); European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Maarja Saluste

European University Institute

Robert Wolfe

Queen's University - School of Policy Studies

Date Written: November 2019

Abstract

The WTO dispute settlement system is in crisis, endangering the future of the organization. The proximate reason for alarm is the dwindling number of Appellate Body (AB) members, the result of the United States blocking new appointments as the terms of sitting members expire. The AB crisis usually is presented as the U.S. against the world. In this paper, we report on the results of a survey of WTO Members’ perceptions of the AB and the role it plays (should play) and contrast this with Members’ revealed preferences in their use of the dispute settlement system and their intervention in WTO debates about the crisis. The data reveal strong support for the basic de-sign of the dispute settlement system but also that the United States is not alone in perceiving that the AB has gone beyond its mandate.

Keywords: WTO, Appellate Body, dispute settlement, conflict resolution

Suggested Citation

Fiorini, Matteo and Hoekman, Bernard and Mavroidis, Petros C. and Saluste, Maarja and Wolfe, Robert, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Appellate Body Crisis: Insider Perceptions and Members’ Revealed Preferences (November 2019). Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2019/95, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827215 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3827215

Matteo Fiorini (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Petros C. Mavroidis

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

European University Institute - Department of Law (LAW) ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Maarja Saluste

European University Institute ( email )

Via Bolognese 156 (Villa Salviati)
50-139 Firenze
ITALY

Robert Wolfe

Queen's University - School of Policy Studies ( email )

Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
15
Abstract Views
84
PlumX Metrics