Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda

40 Pages Posted: 3 Mar 2021

See all articles by Konrad Burchardi

Konrad Burchardi

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES); Stockholm University; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jonathan de Quidt

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)

Selim Gulesci

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Benedetta Lerva

Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets

Stefano Tripodi

Copenhagen Business School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2021

Abstract

Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in the mechanism, which are well-known problems with the BDM. We highlight three such features and test them in the field in rural Uganda, a relevant population for many recent applications. Comprehension is very high, and 86 percent of participants bid optimally for an induced-value voucher, with little variation across treatments. This gives confidence for similar applications, and suggests the comprehension-expediency trade-off is mild.

JEL Classification: C900, C930, D440, O120

Suggested Citation

Burchardi, Konrad and de Quidt, Jonathan and Gulesci, Selim and Lerva, Benedetta and Tripodi, Stefano, Testing Willingness to Pay Elicitation Mechanisms in the Field: Evidence from Uganda (2021). CESifo Working Paper No. 8904, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3796651

Konrad Burchardi (Contact Author)

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

Stockholm University

Universitetsvägen 10
Stockholm, Stockholm SE-106 91
Sweden

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Jonathan De Quidt

Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES) ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

Selim Gulesci

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Benedetta Lerva

Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets ( email )

Stockholm

Stefano Tripodi

Copenhagen Business School ( email )

Solbjerg Plads 3
Frederiksberg C, DK - 2000
Denmark

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