Timing of Commitment in Coalitional Bargaining
44 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2021 Last revised: 27 Aug 2021
Date Written: March 6, 2021
The power to influence the allocation of resources in coalitional bargaining stems from an agent's ability to form multiple majority coalitions (pivotality) or from the relative vote share the agent contributes to a coalition (proportionality). We distinguish between coalitional commitment, where parties defer distributive bargaining when forming a coalition, and allocative commitment, where allocations are determined at the point of coalition formation. We show how the timing of commitment affects the source bargaining power: proportionality is key when coalitional commitment is available prior to allocative commitment, but pivotality is key when there is no difference in timing between the two types of commitment. Our results highlight that, when analyzing multilateral negotiations, the timing of commitment should be considered as a crucial factor determining the distribution of resources.
Keywords: Experiment, Bargaining Power, Coalition Formation, Timing of Commitment, Gamson's Law
JEL Classification: C71, C92, D72, H10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation