Privacy and Antitrust in Digital Platforms

5 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2020 Last revised: 26 Feb 2021

See all articles by Nicholas Economides

Nicholas Economides

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics

Ioannis Lianos

University College London - Faculty of Laws; BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre - HSE National Research University

Date Written: December 25, 2020

Abstract

Dominant digital platforms such as Google and Facebook collect personal information of users by default precipitating a market failure in the market for personal information. We establish the economic harms from the market failure. We discuss conditions for eliminating the market failure and various remedies to restore competition.

Keywords: personal information; Internet search; Google; Facebook; digital; privacy; restrictions of competition; exploitation; market failure; data dominance; abuse of a dominant position; unfair commercial practices; excessive data extraction; self-determination; behavioral manipulation; remedies; portabili

JEL Classification: K21, L1, L12, L4, L41, L5, L86, L88

Suggested Citation

Economides, Nicholas and Lianos, Ioannis, Privacy and Antitrust in Digital Platforms (December 25, 2020). NET Institute Working Paper No. #21-01, NYU Stern School of Business Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3755327 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3755327

Nicholas Economides (Contact Author)

New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

44 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States
212-998-0864 (Phone)
212-995-4218 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/

Ioannis Lianos

University College London - Faculty of Laws ( email )

London
United Kingdom

BRICS Competition Law & Policy Centre - HSE National Research University ( email )

28/11, Shabolovka ulitsa
Moscow, 109028
Russia

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
225
Abstract Views
661
rank
161,876
PlumX Metrics