Frequent Batch Auctions Under Liquidity Constraints
63 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2021
Date Written: December 18, 2020
We exploit European regulatory interventions to investigate the effects of sub-second periodic auctions on market quality under dark trading restrictions. The restrictions are linked to an observable increase in periodic auctions and an economically meaningful loss of liquidity. While periodic auctions ameliorate illiquidity, their effects are significantly less than those of the restrictions; therefore, the combined effects of periodic auctions’ increases and the restrictions are general declines in liquidity and informational efficiency. However, consistent with theory, periodic auctions are linked to reductions in adverse selection costs, thereby underscoring their potential to address latency arbitrage and the technological arms race.
Keywords: Frequent batch auctions; dark trading; MiFID II; latency arbitrage; liquidity; informational efficiency
JEL Classification: G14; G15; G18
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation