Pledge-and-Review in the Laboratory

54 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2021

See all articles by Steffen Lippert

Steffen Lippert

University of Auckland - Department of Economics

James Tremewan

University of Auckland - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 7, 2020

Abstract

We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2019). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast, we find that Pledge-and-Review increases efficiency in all the settings we investigate, and that the improvement is most persistent in our setting without uncertainty. Our results suggest that the Pledge-and-Review institution may be useful, even without uncertainty, as it allows for outcomes with higher contributions than those sustained in the absence of a review stage.

Keywords: pledge and review, public goods, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation

JEL Classification: C72, C78, C91, C92, D02, D71, H41, Q54

Suggested Citation

Lippert, Steffen and Tremewan, James, Pledge-and-Review in the Laboratory (December 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3746562 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3746562

Steffen Lippert (Contact Author)

University of Auckland - Department of Economics ( email )

Auckland
New Zealand

James Tremewan

University of Auckland - Department of Economics ( email )

Auckland
New Zealand

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