Pledge-and-Review in the Laboratory
54 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2021
Date Written: December 7, 2020
We perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2019). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast, we find that Pledge-and-Review increases efficiency in all the settings we investigate, and that the improvement is most persistent in our setting without uncertainty. Our results suggest that the Pledge-and-Review institution may be useful, even without uncertainty, as it allows for outcomes with higher contributions than those sustained in the absence of a review stage.
Keywords: pledge and review, public goods, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation
JEL Classification: C72, C78, C91, C92, D02, D71, H41, Q54
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation