Politicians in Disguise and Financial Experts on the Board: Evidence from Spanish Cajas

Andres P, de Garcia-Rodriguez I, Romero-Merino ME, Santamaria-Mariscal M. Politicians in disguise and financial experts on the board: Evidence from Spanish cajas. BRQ Business Research Quarterly. June 2020. doi:10.1177/2340944420924417

18 Pages Posted: 22 Mar 2021

See all articles by Pablo de Andrés

Pablo de Andrés

Universidad Autonoma de Madrid; ECGI

Inigo Garcia-Rodriguez

University of Burgos

M. Elena Romero‐Merino

University of Burgos

Marcos Santamaría-Mariscal

University of Burgos

Date Written: June 11, 2020

Abstract

This study offers insight into the role of board politicization on the Spanish cajas’ performance from a dual perspective.First, we analyze the effect of a new kind of political directors who occupy board seats as representatives of stakeholders outside the public administrations while maintaining a political affiliation. We call these “hidden” political directors as politicians in disguise. Second, we analyze how political interests can prevent directors with financial expertise from applying their knowledge to improve cajas’ performance. Using a sample of hand-collected data from 45 Spanish cajas, we find that politicians in disguise destroy value in the caja and that politically motivated financial experts on the board do not benefit cajas’ performance.

Keywords: Board composition, cajas, savings banks, politicians, financial experience

JEL Classification: G34, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

Andrés, Pablo de and Garcia-Rodriguez, Inigo and Romero‐Merino, M. Elena and Santamaría-Mariscal, Marcos, Politicians in Disguise and Financial Experts on the Board: Evidence from Spanish Cajas (June 11, 2020). Andres P, de Garcia-Rodriguez I, Romero-Merino ME, Santamaria-Mariscal M. Politicians in disguise and financial experts on the board: Evidence from Spanish cajas. BRQ Business Research Quarterly. June 2020. doi:10.1177/2340944420924417, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3742829

Pablo de Andrés (Contact Author)

Universidad Autonoma de Madrid ( email )

Campus de Cantoblanco
C/ Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 5
Madrid, Madrid 28049
Spain
+34 91 497 6527 (Phone)
+34 91 497 3954 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uam.es

ECGI

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Inigo Garcia-Rodriguez

University of Burgos ( email )

C/ Parralillos s/n
Burgos, 09001
Spain

M. Elena Romero‐Merino

University of Burgos

Hospital del Rey, s/n
Burgos, 09001
Spain

Marcos Santamaría-Mariscal

University of Burgos ( email )

Plaza Infanta Elena
Burgos, Burgos 09001
Spain
34 947 258968 (Phone)

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