Corruption-Related Disclosure in the Banking Industry: Evidence From GIPSI Countries

44 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2021 Last revised: 6 May 2021

See all articles by Pablo de Andrés

Pablo de Andrés

Universidad Autonoma de Madrid; ECGI

Salvatore Polizzi

University of Palermo - d/SEAS

Enzo Scannella

University of Palermo - d/SEAS

Nuria Suárez

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Date Written: December 1, 2020

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates corruption-related disclosure in the banking industry, aiming to identify the most relevant theories which explain why financial institutions disclose corruption-related information to the public in their annual financial reports.Using a total sample of 88 banks from the GIPSI countries during the period 2011-2019, our results reveal that, on average, banks involved in corruption issues disclose less on corruption-related information than banks not involved in any corruption scandal. Moreover, banks not involved in corruption cases disclose even more information after other banks’ corruption events become public. These basic relationships, however, are shaped by the characteristics of each particular country in terms of control of corruption and the specific regulation on non-traditional banking activities. Our results are robust to different specifications of econometric models, and to alternative empirical methods accounting for potential reverse causality and sample selection concerns.

Keywords: Corruption; Disclosure; GIPSI; Institutional quality; Regulation

JEL Classification: G20; G30; K40

Suggested Citation

Andrés, Pablo de and Polizzi, Salvatore and Scannella, Enzo and Suárez, Nuria, Corruption-Related Disclosure in the Banking Industry: Evidence From GIPSI Countries (December 1, 2020). European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 745/2021, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3740729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3740729

Pablo de Andrés

Universidad Autonoma de Madrid ( email )

Campus de Cantoblanco
C/ Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 5
Madrid, Madrid 28049
Spain
+34 91 497 6527 (Phone)
+34 91 497 3954 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uam.es

ECGI

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Salvatore Polizzi

University of Palermo - d/SEAS

Viale delle Scienze, edificio 13
Palermo, 90124
Italy

Enzo Scannella

University of Palermo - d/SEAS ( email )

Viale delle Scienze, edificio 13
Palermo, 90128
Italy
+3909123895305 (Phone)
+39091489346 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.enzoscannella.com

Nuria Suárez (Contact Author)

Universidad Autónoma de Madrid ( email )

Campus Cantoblanco
C/Kelsen, 1
Madrid, Madrid 28049
Spain

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