The Demand for Central Clearing: To Clear or Not to Clear, that is the Question

58 Pages Posted: 5 Nov 2020

See all articles by Mario Bellia

Mario Bellia

European Union - JRC-Ispra, European Commision

Roberto Panzica

Joint Research Center of the European Commission

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE; Ca Foscari University of Venice

Tuomas Peltonen

European Systemic Risk Board

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December, 2017

Abstract

This paper analyses whether the post-crisis regulatory reforms developed by globalstandard-setting bodies have created appropriate incentives for different types of market participants to centrally clear Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivative contracts. Beyond documenting the observed facts, we analyse four main drivers for the decision to clear: 1) the liquidity and riskiness of the reference entity; 2) the credit risk of the counterparty; 3) the clearing member’s portfolio net exposure with the Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP) and 4) post trade transparency. We use confidential European trade repository data on single-name Sovereign Credit Derivative Swap (CDS) transactions, and show that for all the transactions reported in 2016 on Italian, German and French Sovereign CDS 48% were centrally cleared, 42% were not cleared despite being eligible for central clearing, while 9% of the contracts were not clearable because they did not satisfy certain CCP clearing criteria. However, there is a large difference between CCP clearing members that clear about 53% of their transactions and non-clearing members, even those that are subject to counterparty risk capital requirements, that almost never clear their trades. Moreover, we find that diverse factors explain clearing members’ decision to clear different CDS contracts: for Italian CDS, counterparty credit risk exposures matter most for the decision to clear, while for French and German CDS, margin costs are the most important factor for the decision. Moreover, clearing members use clearing to reduce their exposures to the CCP and largely clear contracts when at least one of the traders has a high counterparty credit risk.

Keywords: Central Counterparty Clearing House (CCP), Credit Default Swap (CDS), European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), sovereign

JEL Classification: G18, G28, G32

Suggested Citation

Bellia, Mario and Panzica, Roberto and Pelizzon, Loriana and Peltonen, Tuomas, The Demand for Central Clearing: To Clear or Not to Clear, that is the Question (December, 2017). ESRB: Working Paper Series No. 2017/62, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3723409

Mario Bellia (Contact Author)

European Union - JRC-Ispra, European Commision ( email )

Via Enrico Fermi 2749, Ispra, VA
Ispra (VA), 21027
Italy

Roberto Panzica

Joint Research Center of the European Commission ( email )

Via E. Fermi 2749
Ispra (VA), I-21027
Italy
93100 (Fax)

Loriana Pelizzon

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.safe-frankfurt.de

Ca Foscari University of Venice ( email )

Dorsoduro 3246
Venice, Veneto 30123
Italy

Tuomas Peltonen

European Systemic Risk Board ( email )

Sonnemannstrasse 22
Frankfurt am Main, 60314
Germany

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